Involvement of board chairmen in audit committees and earnings management: Evidence from Malaysia by Al-Absy, Mujeeb Saif Mohsen et al.
Mujeeb Saif Mohsen AL-ABSY, Ku Nor Izah Ku ISMAIL, Sitraselvi CHANDREN, Shehabaddin Abdullah A. AL-DUBAI /  
Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business Vol 7 No 8 (2020) 233–246 233
Print ISSN: 2288-4637 / Online ISSN 2288-4645
doi:10.13106/jafeb.2020.vol7.no8.233
*Acknowledgements:
 We wish to thank Universiti Utara Malaysia for funding this research.
1 First Author and Corresponding Author. Assistant Professor, 
Department of Accounting and Finance, College of Administrative 
and Financial Sciences, Gulf University, Kingdom of Bahrain. [Postal 
Address: Street No. 4324, Sanad, 734, Kingdom of Bahrain] Email: 
dr.mujeeb.saif@gulfuniversity.edu.bh 
2Professor, Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy,
College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia.
3Assistant Professor, Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of
Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia, 
Malaysia.
4 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, School of Business, 
King Faisal University, Saudi Arabia.
© Copyright: The Author(s)
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Non-Commercial License (http://Creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits 
unrestricted noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited.
Involvement of Board Chairmen in Audit Committees and  
Earnings Management: Evidence from Malaysia* 
Mujeeb Saif Mohsen AL-ABSY1, Ku Nor Izah Ku ISMAIL2, Sitraselvi CHANDREN3,  
Shehabaddin Abdullah A. AL-DUBAI4
Received: April 23, 2020 Revised: May 10, 2020 Accepted: July 03, 2020
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of the involvement of the board chairman in the audit committee (AC) on earnings management (EM). 
It examines Bursa Malaysia-listed companies with the lowest positive earnings for the years 2013 to 2015. The Modified Jones Model by 
Kasznik (1999) was used to determine discretionary accruals. An AC that includes its board chairman as an ordinary member is associated 
with greater discretionary accruals. However, a board chairman who is also the chairman of the AC does not seem to influence discretionary 
accruals. This paper supports the agency theory and policy-makers’ efforts to prevent board chairmen from sitting on ACs. It is the first study 
that uses the agency theory to describe the association between the board chairman’s involvement in the both AC and EM. This study alerts 
policy-makers, stakeholders and researchers to the influence of a board chairman serving on the AC in curbing EM. Furthermore, it provides 
empirical evidence that the majority of Malaysian companies whose board chairmen are involved in the AC appoint the chairman as an 
ordinary member of the AC. This indicates that executive directors may affect such actions. Hence, more policies are needed to improve 
AC independence.
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1. Introduction
The high incidence of accounting scandals worldwide 
has pointed out the problem of earnings management 
(EM). It is argued that such scandals are typically followed 
by confirmation of EM activities (Teh, San Ong, & Ying, 
2017). EM takes place when managers use their judgment 
in preparing financial reports or in structuring the firm’s 
transactions in order to alter earnings reports, either to mislead 
stakeholders about the actual performance of business or to 
influence the contractual outcomes that in most companies 
depend on accounting figures (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). It is 
stated that the management of troubled companies typically 
starts with EM, but eventually leads to misrepresentation 
or fraud when the situation is uncontrollable (Jones, 2011). 
In other words, early EM may be an indication of frauds to 
come. 
The EM problem is not new, but it has increased in many 
countries (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003), and Malaysia 
is no an exception, where the extent of EM was greater in 
Malaysia (and other countries in the region such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore) (Leuz et al., 2003) than in other regions 
(see more recently Enomoto, Kimura, and Yamaguchi 
(2015)). EM has therefore been much studied (Nguyen 
& Duong, 2020) and continued to be a popular subject in 
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accountancy research (Soliman & Ragab, 2014). It needs to 
be explored further, especially in Malaysia (Teh et al., 2017).
The reasons for practicing EM is the conflict of interests 
between agent and owner (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To 
overcome this problem, various reforms and standards for 
corporate governance (CG) have been developed worldwide 
and in Malaysia. However, the CG mechanisms among 
Malaysian companies currently appear to be inadequate in 
preventing EM and there is therefore a need for further reform 
(Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman, & Salleh, 2016). Essentially, 
more responsibility needs to be given to the audit committee 
(AC) to constrain EM. Even in companies that implement 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), 
ACs are not effective in constraining EM (Chandrasegaram, 
Rahimansa, Rahman, Abdullah, & Mat, 2013) and not yet 
effectively performing its oversight role (Abdul-Rahman 
& Ali, 2006). Hence, there is a need for more policies to 
reinforce the AC independence (Al-Absy, Ku Ismail, & 
Chandren, 2018a); as previous research has failed to posit a 
definitive association between AC and EM, more studies are 
required (Inaam & Khamoussi, 2016).
One characteristic of an AC could influence its 
effectiveness: its independence. The MCCG version of 2007, 
for example, requires that the majority of AC members must 
be independent, and its recent amendment (MCCG, 2017) 
recommends that an AC should comprise only independent 
directors. The Malaysian Securities Commission is now even 
more serious about the need to ensure AC independence as 
the recent MCCG (2017) also requires that the AC chairman 
should not be the same person as the board chairman. 
This is a timely and laudable move, and is in line with the 
requirements of other countries such as the UK, Australia, 
and Russia. It indicates that the appointment of the board 
chairman to an AC is widespread not only in Malaysia but 
also in other countries.
Even though the separation of the roles of board chairman 
and AC chairman by Malaysian regulators is a desirable 
initiative, in the researcher’s opinion the new regulation 
will not completely solve the problem of AC independence 
because the board chairman can still become involved in 
an AC by being an ordinary member, meaning that the AC 
cannot be seen as truly independent. A board chairman is 
very powerful and tends to dominate the board, especially 
if he is an influential figure or the founder of the company 
(Satkunasingam, Yong, & Cherk, 2012). 
Therefore, the current study expects that the involvement 
of the board chairman in the AC, either acting as chairman or 
just an ordinary member, could affect the AC’s effectiveness 
and independence in mitigating EM. Secondly, the study 
expects that the influence of a board chairman who chairs 
the AC should not equal the influence of a board chairman 
who is just an ordinary member of the AC. Hence, this 
paper investigates the effect on EM practices of the board 
chairman’s involvement in the AC, and whether a board 
chairman who chairs the AC and one who is an ordinary 
member have the same influence on EM. 
The current study argues that the involvement of the 
board chairman either as an AC chairman or a member is not 
appropriate in a country where there is deference to a well-
connected or dominant person; this could result in board 
committees being subservient to the chairman’s directives, 
even if the latter does not practice good CG (Satkunasingam 
et al., 2012). Al-Absy, Ku Ismail, and Chandren (2018b) 
found that EM is higher in companies whose board chairman 
dominates their nomination committee, either was the 
committee chairman or an ordinary member in the committee. 
This study will contribute to the body of knowledge in 
different ways. It is the first study to use the agency theory 
to explain the relationship between the board chairman’s 
involvement in the AC and EM. Second, it introduces a new 
proxy for AC independence, namely, the board chairman’s 
involvement in the AC. Companies whose ACs include board 
chairmen are labeled 1, otherwise 0. Two further measures 
were extracted from this proxy: a company in which the 
board chairman acts as the AC chairman is given the value 
1, and 0 otherwise; and where the board chairman is an 
ordinary member of the AC, it is given the value 1, and 0 
otherwise. Lastly, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
no studies have empirically investigated the effect on EM of 
a board chairman who either acts as chairman of the AC or 
is an ordinary member. The reason for selecting Malaysia is 
because of the low percentage of independent directors on 
boards. Thus, controlling shareholders of some companies in 
Malaysia still dominate both the board nomination committee 
and the selection of directors (The World Bank Report, 
2012, p. 29). Therefore, it is common for family groups 
and controlling shareholders to elect a board chairman who 
belongs to the family or group and also to appoint him as an 
AC chairman or member.
2. Literature Review
The figure for earnings is one of the most important 
elements of an income statement for the majority of readers 
of financial statements, because it is a measurement of a 
company’s performance. It is prepared under the accruals basis 
of accounting, based on accounting principles. However, in 
some cases, the deployment of accruals may bring some issues 
such as EM (Dechow, 1994). The management can normally 
exercise some discretion concerning income recognition 
(Dechow, 1994), because accounting measurements often 
require some judgments to be made by managers (Xie, 
Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). Earnings manipulation via 
accounting principles and methods is called accruals earnings 
management (AEM) and may be the preferred instrument 
for managing opportunistic profits because it has no general 
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direct cash flow outcomes and is somewhat difficult to 
unravel (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005). 
Numerous researchers have studied the extent to which 
EM occurs in companies, but the results are mixed (Xie et 
al., 2003). Importantly, incentives for EM are many (Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999), including (i) capital market expectations 
or valuation; (ii) contracts based on accounting figures; and 
(iii) antitrust or other government regulations. Regardless of 
the different definitions and incentives associated with EM, 
manipulation of earnings in the financial reporting process 
provides deceptive reports to users. The existence of the 
agency problem has led to the need to look for effective 
mechanisms to enhance the alignment between the respective 
interests of owners and agents (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
International efforts have been made to hamper managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours by developing and implementing 
appropriate CG mechanisms, such as the various committees 
of the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983), the 
AC (Klein, 2002), the nominations committee and the 
remuneration committee.
An AC, as an essential mechanism of CG, plays a vital 
role in ensuring the financial integrity and the quality of a 
company’s financial reporting. A well-functioning, active, 
and structured AC may play a significant role in mitigating 
EM (Xie et al., 2003). The majority of regulators have 
recommended that publicly-held companies should establish 
ACs consisting of outside directors. According to Abdullah 
and Nasir (2004), the issue of the AC in Malaysia emerged 
in the mid-1980s around the time of the financial failure of 
Bumiputra Malaysian Finance Ltd, following which in 1986, 
the Malaysian Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia) made 
it mandatory for all financial institutions under its control 
to establish an AC. The requirement was further extended 
in 1990 to include all insurance companies operating in 
the country. Subsequently, in 1993 the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange made the AC compulsory for all its listed 
companies (Abdullah & Nasir, 2004).
3.  Audit Committee Independence and 
Hypotheses
In Malaysia, although the level of independent AC 
directors has increased, the scope and effectiveness of the 
committee are still questionable (Mohammad et al., 2016). 
Following the establishment of an AC in listed companies 
in Malaysia, ACs have yet to have any particular success in 
terms of their monitoring role (Abdul-Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
This is especially the case for family-owned companies 
in which an increase in Type II agency problems (Interest 
disputes between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders) and a decline in the effectiveness of CG 
mechanisms have been observed (Cheung & Chan, 2004). 
This study believes that the AC cannot be effective when the 
chairman of the board is also involved in the AC, either as 
chairman or an ordinary member.
The Finance Committee of Malaysia referred to the role 
of powerful board chairmen who seek to control the board 
decision due to their social or political status, or especially if 
they were the founders of the corporation (Satkunasingam et 
al., 2012). The authors argued that involvement of the board 
chairman in the AC, either as a chairman or a member, is 
inappropriate, especially in a country where there is deference 
to a well-connected or dominant board chairman. Thus, to 
improve the effectiveness of the board’s evaluation of AC 
activities, the chairman of the board should not be involved 
in the AC, either as chairman (Council, 2007; KPMG, 2012; 
MCCG Draft, 2016; Smith, 2003) or member (Smith, 2003).
With respect to the functions of an AC, it is impractical 
for the board’s chair to sit on it. This is because the AC 
reports to the board on how it has fulfilled its obligations and 
makes some recommendations. In addition, the board should 
review the AC’s effectiveness annually (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012). It is thus highly likely that AC independence 
will be compromised when the board chairman sits on the 
AC. Where this occurs, an AC would not be able to fulfil 
its role effectively, which in turn may lead to managers 
practising unethical behaviour such as EM in companies 
whose board is not really independent. This argument has 
been empirically supported by Al-Absy et al. (2018b), who 
found that companies whose board chairman is part of the 
nomination committee i.e., chairman of the committee or 
just a member, are significantly related to a high level of 
EM. Based on agency theory and the discussion above, the 
following hypothesis is suggested:
H1. The board chairman’s involvement in the audit 
committee is positively related to earnings management.
This hypothesis does not consider the different personal 
characteristics and impact of the board chairman either as AC 
chairman or an ordinary member. The literature argues that 
AC effectiveness often depends on the role of its chairman, 
who has a significant effect on the committee. Therefore, 
there is a need for a separate investigation to see whether 
or not the board chairman who chairs the AC and the board 
chairman who is just a member has the same influence on 
the EM. Regulators have focused more on the AC chairman’s 
characteristics, most requiring the AC to be chaired by an 
independent director, and others also requiring the chairman 
to possess accounting expertise. Indeed, the AC chairman has 
more responsibilities than any ordinary member. Therefore, 
an AC chairman may not give his best to the committee if 
he is also the board chairman (MCCG Draft, 2016). This is 
because it is extremely difficult for one person to do two tasks. 
In addition, it is impossible for the board to evaluate the 
AC function when the AC is chaired by the board chairman 
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the effectiveness and independence of the AC, several CG 
codes, such as Bangladesh, Ireland, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, do not allow the board 
chairman to become even an ordinary member of the AC. 
Based on agency theory and the discussion above, the 
following hypothesis is suggested:
H1b. The dual role of board chairman and audit committee 
member is positively related to earnings management.
4. Research Methodology
4.1. Sample Selection
The occurrence of EM is high in companies whose earnings 
are close to zero because managers are usually inspired 
to avoid reporting negative earnings (Huynh & Nguyen, 
2019) by converting the small losses into a small profit 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Yuliana, Anshori, & Alim, 2015). 
Hence, previous studies focused on companies whose return 
on assets (ROA) is near to zero (0 to 0.005) (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Yuliana et al., 2015). Accordingly, this study covers 
only companies with low positive earnings, in average for 
the years 2013 to 2015 (Al-Absy et al., 2018a, 2018b; Al-
Absy, Ku Ismail, & Chandren, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). 
To obtain the sample, first, 54 financial companies, close-
end funds, special-purpose acquisition companies, and real-
estate investment trusts are excluded, as are the 79 companies 
whose ROA data was not available, and the 200 companies 
with negative earnings in one or more years. Next, the average 
ROA for each of the remaining listed companies (475) is 
calculated. Finally, 300 companies with the lowest average 
ROA for the three years were selected. In addition, during 
data collection, a further 12 companies were excluded because 
they belong to industries with fewer than six observations 
(Subramanyam, 1996) or have missing data. Therefore, the 
final sample consists of 864 company-observations. The 
selection of 2013 as the base year was because it was the year 
following the introduction of MCCG 2012.
4.2. Measurement of Earnings Management
Researchers are increasingly using an accruals-based 
measurement as a key proxy of EM (Enomoto et al., 2015). 
Hence, the Modified Jones Model (MJM) by Kasznik (1999) 
is applied to determine the discretionary accruals (DA). 
Kasznik (1999) includes the change in cash flows from 
operations (CFO) as an explanatory variable that increases the 
power of the model (Shuto, 2007). Kasznik (1999) indicates 
that CFO is negatively correlated with total accruals (see. 
Dechow, 1994). In calculating DA and by applying Kaszik’s 
MJM, total accruals are first calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items minus CFO. Furthermore, an ordinary 
(MCCG, 2017). Also, the chairman of the AC must be 
answerable to the chairman of the board regarding the 
activities and responsibilities of the AC (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012; Smith, 2003). Thus, when the chairman of 
the AC and the board is the same person, there are no checks 
and balances, as the chairman of the AC is answerable to 
himself. This chairman duality may affect the performance 
of the committee, especially when the board has a powerful 
chairman (Satkunasingam et al., 2012), which is often the 
case in family-owned companies. However, when the chair 
of the AC is not the same person as the board chairman, he 
or she can offer full commitment to their role and to exercise 
independent judgement (MCCG Draft, 2016).
Recognising the problem of chairman duality, various 
countries have introduced regulations that prevent the 
chairman of a board from becoming an AC chairman. The 
Australian Securities Exchange, for example, requires 
that the AC should, among other things, be chaired by an 
independent person, who is not sitting as the chair of the 
board (Council, 2007). In Russia, the Audit Committee 
Institute also recommends that the AC chairman should 
be independent and must not also be the chairman of the 
board (KPMG, 2012). Recently, in the Malaysian context, 
the MCCG recommended that AC chairman shall be an 
independent director and not be a chairman of the board 
(MCCG, 2017; MCCG Draft, 2016). Consequently, the 
Bursa Malaysia revised its Corporate Governance Guidelines 
requiring all listed companies to avoid the duality problem. 
Based on agency theory and the discussion above, the 
following hypothesis is suggested:
H1a. The dual role of board chairman and audit committee 
chairman is positively related to earnings management.
In contrast to the above, the study expects that companies 
would be more likely to appoint their board chairman as an 
ordinary member of the AC rather than as the committee’s 
chairman. Appointing as an ordinary member a board chairman 
who is not really independent or may not be well qualified can 
be seen as an alternative choice for executive directors, who in 
most cases are family members, to continue to dominate the 
AC’s decisions. This situation could continue while the MCCG 
(2017) does not prevent the board chairman from becoming 
an ordinary member of the AC. Furthermore, companies are 
likely to appoint the board chairman as an ordinary member 
in AC instead of chairman to escape from the requirements 
imposed by regulators on appointing of AC chairman. 
Most regulators require the AC chairman to be 
independent, but few require the AC itself to be fully 
independent. Thus, companies can readily appoint the non-
independent board chairman as an ordinary member of the 
AC if there is a restriction on a non-independent board 
chairman becoming AC chairman. Therefore, to enhance 
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least squares (OLS) test was run for a specific year and 
industry to estimate the coefficients values (α1, α2, α3 and α4) 
from the following model:
( )it itit
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where: TAit-1 is total assets in the past year, ΔREV is the 
revenues in yeart minus revenues in yeart-1, ΔREC is net 
receivables in yeart minus net receivables in yeart-1, PPE is 
gross property, plant and equipment in yeart, ΔCFOit is cash 
flows from operations in yeart less yeart-1, εit is regression 
error terms. Subsequently, the coefficients α1, α2, α3 and α4 
and  derived from Equation 1 are used in the subsequent 
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Lastly, the DA is calculated by extracting NDAit from the 







Importantly, following previous studies (e.g., Abdullah 
& Ku Ismail, 2016; Mohammad et al., 2016), the absolute 
value of DA is used to reflect the extent of EM. In addition, 
to test the robustness of the results, this study uses two 
different proxies of DA, namely the MJM by Dechow, Sloan, 
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In addition, a robustness test is conducted using real 
activities manipulation. Roychowdhury (2006) introduced 
three variables that capture the influence of real activities 
manipulation: the abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operations (ABCFO), the abnormal levels of production 
costs (ABPROD) and the abnormal levels of discretionary 
expenses (ABDISX). The normal levels of each variable 
are estimated by running the following cross-sectional 
regression to estimate coefficients for every industry and 
year for each variable respectively:
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where: St is sales during periodt, St–1 is sales at the 
end of periodt-1, ΔSt is sales during periodt minus sales for 
the previous periodt, ΔSt–1 is one year lag of ΔSt, PRODt 
is cost of goods sold and change in inventory during 
periodt, DISEXPt is the sum of expenses for research and 
development, advertising, sales, general and administration 
in periodt. 
Subsequently, the abnormal level of each variable is 
its actual level minus its normal level. Essentially, this 
study standardised the value of each variable of ABCFO, 
ABPROD and ABDISEXP (Chen, Cheng, & Wang, 
2010; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Haji-Abdullah & Wan-
Hussin, 2015). Previous studies provide evidence that 
companies who engage in increase-earnings manipulation 
are most definitely to own low CFO and low discretionary 
expenditures while they are most likely to show high 
production costs. Accordingly, to attain consistency across 
variables, ABDISEXP and ABCFO are multiplied by (–1) 
where the higher values of ABCFO and ABDISEXP reflect 
the higher real activities manipulations (Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010; Haji-Abdullah & Wan-Hussin, 2015). Therefore, 
this study combined the standardised values of ABCFO, 
ABPROD and ABDISX to represent the aggregate value 
of abnormal levels of real earnings management (REM) 
according to the equation below:
REM = ABCFO*-1 + ABPROD + ABDISX*-1 (9)
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Moreover, to be consistent with DA’s proxies, this study 
uses the absolute value of REM to reflect the level of real 
activities manipulation as recommended by Chen et al. 
(2010) and following Kwon, Na, and Park (2017).
4.3. Empirical Model
The OLS regression is run to test the influence of the 
board chairman’s involvement in the AC (BCHINV) on the 
practice of EM (Hypothesis 1). To control the relationship, this 
study includes some variables related to CG characteristics – 
board independence (BIND), board size (BSIZE), frequency 
of board meetings (BMEET), AC independence (ACIND), 
AC size (ACSIZE), frequency of AC meetings (ACMEET), 
ownership concentration (OWNCON), and audit quality 
(BIG4). It also includes some variables related to the 
company-specific characteristics – company size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), and return on assets (ROA). Hence, the 
following regression is applied:
DA=  β0 + β1 BCHINV + β2 BIND + β3 BSIZE + β4BMEET 
 + β5 ACIND + β6 ACSIZE + β7 ACMEET 
+ β8 OWNCON + β9 BIG4 + β10 SIZE + β11 LEV  
+ β12 ROA + ε (Model 1)
where DA is the absolute value of DA using MJM by 
Kasznik (1999). The measurement details for all variables 
are displayed in Table 1.
Secondly, the study expects that the influence of a board 
chairman who chairs the AC will not be the same as that 
of a board chairman who is an ordinary member of the 
AC. Subsequently, this study categorises board chairman 
involvement in an AC into two styles: board chairman 
duality (BCHDUAL) and board chairman as AC member 
(BCHMEM). Thus, to examine the influence on EM of board 
chairman duality and board chairman membership (H1a and 
H1b), the following regression is run:
DA =  β0 + β1 BCHDUAL + β2 BCHMEM + β3 BIND + 
β4 BSIZE + β5 BMEET + β6 ACIND + β7 ACSIZE + 
β8 ACMEET + β9 OWNCON + β10 BIG4 + β11 SIZE 
+ β12 LEV + β13 ROA + ε.  (Model 2)
Robustness tests are also conducted using the previous 
two models, but using a different proxy for DA, the Jones 
Model (1991) and the modified of this Model by Dechow 
et al. (1995) as well as the sum value of the three proxies of 
REM presented by Roychowdhury (2006).
5. Results and Discussion
Table 2 displays the average (mean) value of the 
absolute DA using the MJM by Kasznik (1999), which is 
0.036. Regarding the involvement of board chairman in AC, 
Table 2 shows that almost one-third (31.25%) of company 
observations appointing the board chairman as either AC 
Table 1: Summary of the Operationalisation of the Variables
Acronym Measurement and resource
DA AbsolutevalueofDAusingMJMbyKasznik(1999).
REM Absolute value of real earnings management using Roychowdhury (2006) Model.
BCHINV 1 if the board chairman involves in AC either as a chairman or a member, 0 otherwise.
BCHDUAL 1 if the board chairman is an AC chairman, 0 otherwise. 
BCHMEM 1 if the board chairman involves in AC as a member, 0 otherwise.
BIND Proportion of board independent directors. 
BSIZE Number of directors on the board. 
BMEET Number of board meeting per year. 
ACIND Proportion of AC independent directors
ACSIZE Number of directors in AC. 
ACMEET Number of meetings per year for AC. 
OWNCON Proportion of shares held by top 10 shareholders.
BIG4 1 if the annual report of the company audited by Big4 firm, 0 otherwise.
SIZE Natural log value of total assets. 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets.
ROA Net income divided by total assets.
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the OLS regression with a robust function. Column A in 
Table 4 shows no evidence that board chairman involvement 
in AC, either a chairman or ordinary member is significantly 
associated with DA. Hence, this does not support H1, which 
states that a board chairman’s involvement in the AC is 
positively related to EM. Therefore, the study expects that 
the influence of and characteristics of a board chairman 
who chairs the AC could not be the same as those of a 
board chairman who is just an ordinary member. This may 
be an explanation of the insignificant result. Therefore, 
investigating separately the influence of each of them on EM 
could provide beneficial results.
Column B of Table 4 provides no evidence that the dual 
role of board chairman and AC chairman is significantly 
associated with DA. Hence, this does not support H1a, 
which states that the dual role is positively related to EM. 
This result is in line with Al-Arussi and Shamkhi (2016) 
who found no significant relationship between the board 
chairman also being chairman of the AC and the low level 
of Internet financial disclosures. However, it is inconsistent 
with Al-Absy et al. (2018b), who found that the dual role 
of board chairman and nomination committee chairman is 
significantly positively related to high EM. 
chairman or AC member. This is very high considering 
that AC independence is a major concern among policy-
makers worldwide. Specifically, 19.44% of the company-
observations indicate appointing the board chairman as a 
member of the AC, and 11.81% as AC chairman. This shows 
that the percentage of board chairmen who serve on an AC 
is reasonably high, especially as an ordinary member. Upon 
further scrutinising the data, it is found that the phenomenon 
is common among family companies. 
To eliminate the outliers, this study winsorizes extreme 
observations of ACMEET and ACSIZE in the bottom and 
top 1%; and extreme observations of BMEET using 2%. 
Moreover, skewness and kurtosis are used to check the 
normality assumption. Table 2 shows no significant violation 
of the normality in the dataset of individual variables because 
kurtosis and skewness of each variable are lower than ±10 
and ±3 respectively. In addition, Pearson’s correlation is used 
to check the multicollinearity issue among the variables. 
Accordingly, Table 3 shows that none of the correlation 
matrices between variables exceeds 0.80. 
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Durbin-
Watson tests are applied to check the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation problem, respectively. All our models suffer 
from heteroscedasticity problems. Consequently, we applied 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (N=864)
A. Continuous Variables
Variables Mean SD. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
DA 0.036 0.035 0.000 0.242 1.763 7.013
BIND 0.474 0.122 0.222 1.000 0.704 3.327
BSIZE 7.418 1.909 4.000 17.000 0.985 4.840
BMEET 5.569 1.928 4.000 13.000 2.172 8.002
ACIND 0.900 0.145 0.667 1.000 -0.805 1.737
ACSIZE 3.240 0.481 3.000 5.000 1.856 5.630
ACMEET 5.039 1.146 3.000 10.000 1.838 7.793
SIZE (lnAsset) 13.485 1.571 10.098 18.579 0.796 3.497
LEV (%) 20.775 15.162 0.000 68.560 0.422 2.475
OWNCON 0.648 0.140 0.218 0.963 -0.314 2.622
ROA (%) 4.412 2.510 0.010 15.160 0.657 3.574
B. Dummy Variables
Yes (1) No
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
BCHINV 270 31.25 594 68.75
BCHDUAL 102 11.81 762 88.19
BCHMEM 168 19.44 696 80.56
BIG4 459 53.13 405 46.88
Definitions of variables are given in Table 1.
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Analysis (N=864)
Variables DA BCHINV BCHDUAL BCHMEM BIND BSIZE BMEET
DA 1
BCHINV 0.071** 1
BCHDUAL -0.007 0.543*** 1
BCHMEM 0.089*** 0.729*** -0.180*** 1
BIND 0.016 0.030 0.006 0.030 1
BSIZE -0.085** -0.203*** -0.101*** -0.155*** -0.322*** 1
BMEET 0.071** -0.084** -0.062* -0.048 0.058* 0.207*** 1
ACIND 0.075** -0.087** 0.033 -0.128*** 0.408*** 0.098*** -0.093***
ACSIZE -0.027 0.069** -0.003 0.084** 0.204*** 0.300*** 0.284***
ACMEET -0.025 -0.093*** -0.056* -0.063* 0.036 0.142*** 0.593***
SIZE -0.117*** -0.129*** -0.078** -0.088** -0.017 0.363*** 0.352***
LEV 0.058* -0.034 -0.034 -0.012 -0.111*** 0.141*** 0.086**
OWNCON -0.049 -0.101*** -0.051 -0.077** -0.115*** 0.040 0.101***
ROA 0.051 -0.076** -0.110*** 0.001 -0.058* 0.082** -0.002
BIG4 -0.077** -0.112*** -0.023 -0.113*** 0.037 0.122*** 0.163***
Continues Table 3










ACMEET 0.005 0.134*** 1
SIZE -0.126*** 0.279*** 0.299*** 1
LEV 0.035 -0.011 0.128*** 0.343*** 1
OWNCON -0.105*** 0.061* 0.047 0.045 -0.076** 1
ROA -0.057* -0.001 -0.049 0.045 -0.096*** -0.021 1
BIG4 -0.080** 0.208*** 0.109*** 0.468*** 0.126*** 0.054 0.021 1
*, **, *** are significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. Definitions of variables are given in Table 1.
The explanation of this result may be that board chairman 
duality imposes a double responsibility for any potential 
financial risk. Thus, a board chairman who is also the AC 
chairman may pay greater attention to controlling EM and is 
less likely to engage in it; although the result is not significant 
the direction is negative. In particular, we note that 39% of 
those board chairmen who are also AC chairmen possess 
accounting knowledge. Moreover, the board chairmen who 
are also AC chairmen are independent directors and are not 
related to any of the directors. This is because the MCCG 
requires companies to appoint an AC chairman who is an 
independent director. 
However, in terms of the board chairman being an 
ordinary member of the AC, Column B of Table 4 shows 
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that this is associated with higher DA. This result supports 
H1b, which states that the board chairman also being an AC 
member is positively related to EM. This finding indicates that 
the presence of the board chairman on the AC as a member 
may jeopardise the AC’s independence, and thus weaken 
the effectiveness of the AC in monitoring the company’s 
activities, including EM practices. This result is consistent 
with Al-Absy et al. (2018b), who found that board chairman 
also being an ordinary member of the nomination committee 
is significantly positively related to high EM. Appointing a 
board chairman as an ordinary member of an AC can be seen 
as an alternative to the board chairman also chairing the AC, 
given the restriction on a non-independent board chairman 
becoming an AC chairman. That is, when companies are not 
allowed to appoint a non-independent board chairman as the 
AC chairman, they may instead choose to appoint the former 
as an ordinary member, and by doing so the influence of the 
board chairman persists.
It is observed that 25% of companies appoint a non-
independent board chairman as an ordinary member of an 
AC (42 from 168 company-observations). In addition, 23% 
of companies appoint a board chairman who is a family 
member of directors or shareholders in AC as an ordinary 
member (38 from 168 company-observations). It is more 
likely that the purpose of appointing the board chairman as 
an ordinary member of the AC is to dampen the effectiveness 
and independence of the AC rather than to monitor the 
financial reporting process, as it is observed that only 11% 
of board chairmen who are ordinary members of the AC 
possess accounting knowledge (18 from 168 company-
observations). That is, it appears that the appointment is 
not mainly to monitor the financial reports, but rather to 
dominate the AC through their social or political status, or 
especially if they are the founders of the corporation. 
As for the control variables, the frequency of board 
meetings (BMEET) is associated with high DA, which is 
consistent with Mansor, Che-Ahmad, Ahmad-Zaluki, and 
Osman (2013). However, the number of board directors 
(BSIZE) is associated with low DA, which is consistent 
with Xie et al. (2003). Bigger boards may involve more 
independent directors; this may reduce the extent of EM 
practices. The results of this study show that a high proportion 
of board independent directors (BIND) is associated with 
low DA. This result is consistent with Prencipe and Bar-
Yosef (2011) and Xie et al. (2003).
Table 4 also shows that high frequency of AC meetings 
(ACMEET) is associated with low DA, which is in line with 
Xie et al. (2003). However, high proportion of independent 
directors on the AC (ACIND) is associated with high DA. 
The result indicates that ACIND fails to question or act 
against management activities (Mohammad et al., 2016), 
which may due to the information asymmetry problem. This 
study found no significant relationship between ACSIZE 
Table 4:RegressionResultoftheMainModel(Kasznik’s
Model)
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*, **, *** are significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions of variables 
are given in Table 1.
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and EM, consistent with most studies in Malaysia such 
as Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2016) and Saleh, Iskandar, 
and Rahmat (2007). In addition, there is no significant 
relationship between ownership concentration (OWNCON) 
and EM, which in line with Abdul-Rahman and Ali (2006) 
and Mohammad et al. (2016). Similarly, this study finds 
no significant relationship between audit quality (BIG4) 
and EM, again supporting the majority of studies such as 
Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2016) and Mohammad et al. (2016). 
Table 4 shows that leverage (LEV) is associated with high 
DA. The positive result for LEV on DA is in line with prior 
studies in Malaysia such Saleh et al. (2007). This is expected 
because companies with financial difficulties are most likely 
to manage earnings. Further, it is found that company size 
(SIZE) is negatively associated with DA. Lastly, this study 
finds a significant positive relationship between ROA and 
DA, which is consistent with other studies (Abdullah & Ku 
Ismail, 2016; Saleh et al., 2007).
6. Robustness Tests
6.1.  Using Different Measurements of Earnings 
Management
For the robustness test, as explained earlier, this study 
uses a different proxy for EM, which provides reliable results 
and avoids bias towards one measurement (Al-Jaifi, 2017). 
Table 5 shows the regression results of Model 1 and Model 
2 using different proxies for EM: the absolute value of DA 
calculated by the Jones Model (1991) as shown in Column 
A, the MJM by Dechow et al. (1995) as shown in column 
B, and the absolute value of REM as shown in Column C. 
The results for Model 1 in all Columns of Table 5 show no 
evidence that board chairman involvement in an AC (either 
as a chair or a member) is associated with the absolute DA 
and REM, which is consistent with the result of Model 1 
(using Kasznik’s model) in Column A of Table 4. 
Regarding Model 2, the results are consistent with those 
(using Kasznik’s model) shown in Column B of Table 4. In 
more detail, Model 2 in Columns A and B of Table 5 show 
no evidence that board chairman duality is associated with 
a high level of absolute DA. However, Model 2 in Column 
C of Table 5 shows evidence that board chairman duality is 
associated with a low level of absolute REM. In terms of a 
board chairman who is only an ordinary member, Model 2 
in all Columns of Table 5 show evidence of association with 
a high level of absolute DA and REM. This result matches 
those for Model 2 (using Kasznik’s model) in Column B of 
Table 4. As for the control variables, the results of Column 
A using the Jones Model (1991) and Column B using the 
MJM by Dechow et al. (1995) are similar to the earlier ones 
recorded in Table 4 (using Kasznik’s model), except for 
BIND, BSIZE and ACMEET. Regarding Column C using 
REM, the result of control variables in the majority of cases 
appears to be different from the proxies of DA. 
6.2.  Using Lagged Independent Variables of the 
Main Model
Despite the wide range of control variables used in the 
current study’s models to reduce the possibility of endogeneity 
and mis-specification (Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, 2011), there 
is a need for testing the potential reverse causality between 
CG mechanisms and the level of earnings (Xie et al., 2003). 
Therefore, to control the potential reverse causality problem, 
Models 1 and 2 (using Kasznik’s model) were re-estimated 
using the lagged independent variables values (Al-Jaifi, 
2017). Column A of Table 6 shows the results, which are 
consistent with the previous results of Models 1 and 2 in 
Table 4, regarding BCHINV, BCHDUAL and BCHMEM. 
This indicates that reverse causality is impossible to occur.
6.3.  Using Different Regression Estimator for the 
Main Model
It is argued that random-effects feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) is asymptotically more efficient and 
its estimator of the asymptotic variation takes the normal 
form (Wooldridge, 2010). Thus, the study re-runs Models 
1 and 2 (Kasznik’s model) using FGLS regression with a 
panel-specific heteroscedastic error structure (Yoshikawa 
& Rasheed, 2010) instead of OLS regression to test the 
robustness of the results. Column B of Table 6 shows 
the results of the re-run for Models 1 and 2 using FGLS 
regression, which are consistent with the results of Models 1 
and 2 in Table 4 using OLS regression. 
7. Conclusion
One important feature of an AC is its independence, and 
attempts have been made to associate AC independence with 
earnings quality. Another aspect of AC independence that 
most researchers have ignored is the involvement of board 
chairmen on the committee. It is only recently that various 
jurisdictions around the world have instituted the requirement 
that a company’s board chairman should not chair the AC, 
or even sit on the AC. So, this study investigates whether 
board chairman involvement in an AC was associated with 
EM practices in Malaysia before the new regulation was 
introduced.
Consistent with the agency theory, it is found that an AC 
that includes its board chairman as an ordinary member of 
the AC is associated with greater absolute DA. However, 
a board chairman who also acts as the AC chairman does 
not influence absolute DA. A robustness test is conducted 
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Table 5: Regression Result Using Different Measurements of Earnings Management
Variables
Column A (Jones) Column B (Dechow) Column C (REM)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
BCHINV 0.00545 0.00357 0.0562
(0.00360) (0.00349) (0.0942)
BCHDUAL -0.00268 -0.00327 -0.281***
(0.00499) (0.00476) (0.108)
BCHMEM 0.0106** 0.00788* 0.269**
(0.00436) (0.00425) (0.120)
BIND 0.00697 0.00487 -0.00219 -0.00396 1.512*** 1.425***
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.509) (0.506)
BSIZE -0.00121 -0.00123 -0.00162 -0.00163 0.0371 0.0365
(0.00110) (0.00110) (0.00111) (0.00110) (0.0327) (0.0326)
BMEET 0.00332*** 0.00332*** 0.00286** 0.00287** 0.0149 0.0151
(0.00114) (0.00115) (0.00113) (0.00114) (0.0299) (0.0299)
ACIND 0.0257** 0.0289** 0.0354*** 0.0380*** -0.748* -0.616
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.389) (0.392)
ACSIZE -0.00498 -0.00529 -0.00271 -0.00297 -0.206** -0.219**
(0.00333) (0.00333) (0.00328) (0.00327) (0.105) (0.104)
ACMEET -0.00137 -0.00139 -0.000730 -0.000751 -0.0216 -0.0226
(0.00172) (0.00171) (0.00169) (0.00168) (0.0452) (0.0450)
SIZE -0.00372*** -0.00370*** -0.00431*** -0.00430*** -0.187*** -0.186***
(0.00120) (0.00121) (0.00117) (0.00118) (0.0347) (0.0347)
LEV 0.000316*** 0.00030*** 0.00036*** 0.000345*** 0.00498* 0.00450
(0.000115) (0.000115) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.00281) (0.00280)
OWNCON -0.00968 -0.00956 -0.00733 -0.00723 0.654** 0.659**
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.316) (0.313)
ROA 0.00137** 0.00125* 0.00178*** 0.00168** 0.0341* 0.0290
(0.000667) (0.000667) (0.000670) (0.000674) (0.0178) (0.0178)
BIG4 -0.00151 -0.000987 -0.00244 -0.00200 0.153 0.174*
(0.00342) (0.00342) (0.00332) (0.00332) (0.0979) (0.0977)
Constant 0.0791*** 0.0788*** 0.0744*** 0.0741*** 3.476*** 3.462***
(0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.560) (0.560)
Years dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included
Ind. dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included
F-value 3.14 3.13 3.96 3.86 4.80 5.45
Sig 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.055 0.062 0.067 0.071 0.073 0.087
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
*, **, *** are significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions of variables are given 
in Table 1.
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Table 6: RegressionResultoftheMainModel(Kasznik’sModel)UsingLaggedIndependentVariablesandFGLSEstimator
Column A: Using Lagged Independent Variables Column B: Using FGLS Estimator







L.BCHINV 0.00450 BCHINV 0.00134
(0.00324) (0.00165)
L.BCHDUAL -0.000381 BCHDUAL -0.00294
(0.00475) (0.00193)
L.BCHMEM 0.00767** BCHMEM 0.00596***
(0.00389) (0.00208)
L.BIND -0.0280** -0.0293** BIND -0.0118 -0.0152**
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.00764) (0.00763)
L.BSIZE -0.00211** -0.00212** BSIZE -0.00187*** -0.00192***
(0.000849) (0.000848) (0.000438) (0.000435)
L.BMEET 0.00363*** 0.00364*** BMEET 0.00284*** 0.00288***
(0.00108) (0.00108) (0.000459) (0.000454)
L.ACIND 0.0504*** 0.0521*** ACIND 0.0237*** 0.0252***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.00543) (0.00537)
L.ACSIZE 0.00212 0.00195 ACSIZE 0.00212 0.00186
(0.00330) (0.00327) (0.00161) (0.00158)
L.ACMEET -0.00223 -0.00227 ACMEET -0.00254*** -0.00256***
(0.00147) (0.00146) (0.000654) (0.000655)
L.SIZE -0.00359*** -0.00358*** SIZE -0.00217*** -0.00217***
(0.00104) (0.00105) (0.000477) (0.000473)
L.LEV 0.000175 0.000169 LEV 0.000198*** 0.000190***
(0.000109) (0.000109) (5.09e-05) (5.05e-05)
L.OWNCON -0.00704 -0.00705 OWNCON -0.00749 -0.00750
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.00514) (0.00495)
L.ROA 4.30e-05 -5.41e-05 ROA 0.00130*** 0.00122***
(0.000595) (0.000581) (0.000292) (0.000282)
L.BIG4 -0.000875 -0.000552 BIG4 -0.00139 -0.00119
(0.00311) (0.00308) (0.00153) (0.00151)
Constant 0.0540*** 0.0543*** Constant 0.0445*** 0.0463***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.00794) (0.00778)
Year dummy Included Included Years dummy Included Included
Ind. dummy Included Included Ind. dummy Included Included
F-value 4.35 4.20 Wald chi2 138.87 150.88
Sig 0.0000 0.0000 Sig 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.087 0.091 R-squared 0.070 0.073
Observations 576 576 Observations 864 864
*, **, *** are significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions of variables are 
given in Table 1; however, in this regression, the lagged values of 
variables are used (a one-year lag).
*, **, *** are significant at level 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. R2 calculated by OLS 
regression. Definitions of variables are given in Table 1.
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by using two different proxies of DA, the Jones Model and 
MJM by Dechow et al. (1995). The results confirm that 
BCHMEM is associated with greater DA while BCHDUAL 
is not associated with DA. Furthermore, a robustness test 
is conducted using a proxy of REM, the sum value of the 
three proxies announced by Roychowdhury (2006). The 
results show that the presence of BCHMEM is more likely 
to increase the level of REM. However, the presence of 
BCHDUAL is more likely to reduce the level of REM.
Although the Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia 
have taken a laudable step in enhancing AC independence in 
the MCCG 2017 and the proposed Corporate Governance 
Guidelines, respectively, our results suggest that the 
regulators should prevent the board chairman not only from 
being an AC chairman, but also from sitting on the AC. 
Our study aids policy-makers, not only in Malaysia but 
in other parts of the world, in enhancing their regulations 
with respect to AC independence. In addition, the findings 
provide valuable information for the business community, 
academics and researchers. Although this study finds that 
chairman duality does not increase the prevalence of EM, it 
is believed that other factors such as family ownership and 
the chairman’s accounting expertise may act as a moderating 
influence. We therefore suggest that more research is needed 
to investigate ways of reducing the extent of EM in order to 
better serve stakeholders’ interests. 
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